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Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court

Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court:
Managing Constitutional Conflict
in an Authoritarian,Aspirationally
'Islamic' State
CLARK B. LOMBARDI *

Constitutional review in the Egyptian legal system is today carried out by a special
constitutional court.' This court is the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, often referred
to by its acronym, the SCC. It is an important example of a puzzling phenomenon-a
liberal court that is permitted to operate, at least for a time, in an authoritarian regime.
Studying this Court helps us understand why such courts are created. It also helps to
demonstrate the fragility of such institutions, once they emerge.
The SCC is Egypt's first effective institution of judicial review. Ironically enough, it
owes its existence to an authoritarian regime's fear of independent judicial review. After
the judiciary in Egypt asserted the right to exercise judicial review, the government of
Jamal Abd al-Nasir feared it would exercise review in a manner uncongenial to the regime.
The Nasir regime thus decided to take judicial review out of the hands of the judiciary and
put it, instead, in the hands of a special constitutional court that he intended to control.
The decision to create a constitutional court, however, had unexpected consequences.
Nasir's successor, Anwar al-Sadat, modified the structure of the new constitutional
court-retaining control over appointments, but giving it more independence. He also
renamed it the Supreme Constitutional Court. Sadat's reform of the constitutional court
coincided with a period of activism among the Egyptian bar and judiciary. The spirit of
the age affected the new court. After a quiet first decade of operation, the SCC in the
1990s defied the wishes of the Egyptian president and became a liberal activist institution
that was often in open confrontation with the executive. More surprising still, during

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, Carnegie Scholar 2006. The author is
grateful to the University of Washington and the Carnegie Corporation for research support. The author thanks
Greta Austin, Michael Feener, Andrew Harding, Victor Ramraj, Arun Thiruvengadam and some other generous
friends for invaluable comments. Statements made and views expressed are those of the author and all errors
are solely his responsibility.
I Transliterations follow the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) -without macrons for long
vowels or dots under letters such as the aspirated 'h'.
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this period, the Court's liberal majority, which was entirely composed of secular-trained
judges, actively reached out to the Islamic opposition. They used Islamic legal arguments
in support of their liberal vision and issued decisions that had the effect of empowering
the Islamist opposition-thereby building support among Islamists for the court and its
liberal commitments.
In the face of these unexpected challenges, the executive sought successfully to
undermine the liberal majority on the Court. From 2001 to the present day, the SCC has
arguably ceased to exercise any meaningful check on the executive. It remains to be seen
whether the liberal SCC has been forever subdued or whether it is in hibernation, ready to
awaken in the future.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Modem Egyptian Legal System
The modern Egyptian legal system took shape during the late nineteenth century. 2 Under
considerable pressure from colonial powers, Egypt adopted in 1883 a civil code modeled
on the French Civil Code and later adopted other codes based on continental European
models. To apply these codes, the government established a new court system modeled
on the French system. That system serves as the skeleton of Egypt's current system. In
contemporary Egypt, the National Courts continue to be the courts of general jurisdiction
for private actions and criminal law. An entirely separate system of administrative courts
(mahakim al-idariyya)operates within the Council of State (Maflis al-Dawla).4 One also finds
a number of courts with more specialized jurisdictions which problematically overlap
with the jurisdiction of the national and administrative courts.
Judicial Review in Egypt and the Creation of Constitutional Courts
For much of the twentieth century, it was unclear whether any Egyptian courts had the
power to perform judicial review. After Egypt gained full independence over judicial
matters in 1937, elite lawyers urged that courts be given the power of judicial review. In
1948, the High Administrative Court in the Council of State issued an opinion in which it
definitively claimed for the judiciary the right to engage in a limited form of constitutional

For a history of the Egyptian legal system, see Brown, Nathan J. (1997) The Rule of Law in the Arab World at
26-31. For a comprehensive introduction to the contemporary system, see generally Dupret, Baudouin and
Bernard-Maugiron, Nathalie (eds) (2002) Egypt and its Laws. For a discussion of constitutional litigation in
Egypt, see also Lombardi, Clark B. (2006) State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt at 141-158.
1 See Dupret, Baudouin and Bernard-Maugiron, Nathalie (2002) 'Introduction: A General Presentation of Law
and Judicial Bodies' in Egypt and its Laws supra note 2 at xxviii-xxxi.
4 See Dupret and Bernard-Maugiron, 'Introduction' supra note 3 at xxxi-xxxiii; Hill, Enid (1993) 'The
Administrative Courts of Egypt and Administrative Law' in Mallat, Chibli (ed) Islam and PublicLaw at 207-28;
Sherif, Adel Omar (1998-99) 'An Overview of the Egyptian Court System' in (5) Yearbook of Islamic and Middle
Eastern Law.
I On these courts, see generally el-Islam, Seif 'Exceptional Laws and Exceptional Courts' in Egypt and its Laws,
supra note 3 at 359ff; Farhang, Michael (1994) 'Terrorism and Military Trials in Egypt: Presidential Decree No.
375 and the Consequences for Judicial Autonomy' (35) HarvardInternationalLaw Journal at 235-236.
2
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review,6 and its position was supported by important legal academics.' However, Egyptian
courts never got the opportunity to exercise freely their self-proclaimed powers of judicial
review. After Jamal Abd al-Nasir took power in a military coup, the judiciary thought
it unwise to exercise aggressively its newly-claimed right of judicial review. Worried,
though, that the judiciary's self-restraint might cease, Nasir stripped the courts of their
jurisdiction to engage in constitutional review and lodged the power of review in a new
institution firmly under the control of the executive. Law No. 81 of 1969 stripped the
existing courts of any right to determine which laws were unconstitutional. Law No. 66
of 1970 placed the right of constitutional review in a new Supreme Court (al-Mahkamaal'Ulia) with little independence.9 Thus, ironically, a constitutional court was established to
ensure that no meaningful constitutional review took place.
Egypt never felt the full impact of Nasir's Machiavellian strategy to create a nonindependent and, ultimately, illiberal constitutional court. Nasir died in 1970, one year
after establishing Egypt's first constitutional court, and Nasir's successor, Anwar alSadat, began a series of reforms that would lead to changes in the structure, staffing and,
ultimately, the behavior of Egypt's constitutional court. Upon taking office, Sadat decided
cautiously to liberalize the economy and to re-establish the state's formal ideology on a
less rigidly socialist model. To help manage the new (and controversial) market economy
and to help establish the dwindling popular legitimacy of the government, Sadat began
to reform and liberalize the legal system. In the process, Nasir's constitutional court
underwent subtle but significant changes.
Sadat's 1971 Constitution provided for the establishment of a new constitutional court,
called the SCC. The Constitution did not provide, however, many details about the new
court.10 Ultimately, the process of drafting the legislation took the better part of ten years,
during which time the old Supreme Court continued to operate on an interim basis. In 1979,
a law was finally enacted that reflected the Sadat's government's cautious embrace both of
economic liberalization and of some degree of judicial empowerment. It established the
SCC as a constitutional court whose justices, once they had been appointed, would have
considerable independence."

Case 65, Judicial Year 1 (Feb 10, 1948). See also Hill, Enid (1997) 'Establishing the Doctrine of Judicial Review
in Egypt and the United States' in Cotran, E. and Sherif, A. 0. (eds) (1997) The Role of theJudiciaryin the Protection
of Human Rights at 323, 324-330.
7 Hill, 'Establishing the Doctrine' supra note 6 at 328-329. For the perspective of three SCC judges, see E1-Morr,
'Awad et al (1996) 'The Supreme Constitutional Court and Its Role in the Egyptian Judicial System' in Boyle,
Kevin and Sherif, Adel Omar (eds) (1996) Human Rights and Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Constitutional
Court of Egypt at 38-39.
' See Brown, The Rule of Law supra note 2 at 69-92.
9 See Sherif, Adel Omar (1995) Al-Qada' al-DusturifiMisr [ConstitutionalJustice in Egypt] at 80-88; Brown, The
Rule of Law, supra note 2 at 91-92; Moustafa, Tamir (2007) The Strugglefor ConstitutionalPower: Law, Politics and
Economic Development in Egypt at 65-67.
10 Egypt Const., art. 174-178 (1971). Translations here follow that of Egypt's State Information Authority,
available at www.Egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/Constitution/index.asp.
11Law No. 48 (1979). A translation by Awad el-Morr (former Chief Justice of the SCC) was published in
Boyle and Sherif (eds) Human Rights and Democracy supra note 7. Translations here will follow this translation.
During those eight years, the existing Supreme Court continued to be a transitional organ.
6
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Reasons for the creation of an independent constitutional court
A number of political scientists have asked in recent years why governments in countries
without a tradition of judicial review would ever create independent institutions with
the power of judicial review. Some favor evolutionary explanations, which propose
that for ideological or administrative reasons states find it impossible to survive without
institutions of judicial review. 12 In a challenge to such evolutionary theories, several
scholars have argued that there is nothing mechanical about the spread of judicial review.
Looking at a range of countries that have recently introduced judicial review, for example,
Tom Ginsburg, Ran Hirschl and Tamir Moustafa have each argued that elites will only
empower judges with the power of judicial review when very specific circumstances exist.
Based on a study of Asian countries that created courts during the transition from
authoritarian rule to democracy, Ginsburg argues that judicial review is often created by
elites who feel they may imminently lose power in a democratic transition. By creating
institutions composed of sympathetic unelected officials with the power of judicial review,
these elites feel they will be able to influence policy long after they are removed from
office.13 Hirschl has developed a slightly different thesis, which he argues can account for
the recent establishment of judicial review not only in transitional democracies but also in
more mature democracies such as South Africa, New Zealand, Israel and Canada. Hirschl
proposes that judicial review is granted as a form of 'hegemonic preservation' by elites
committed to unpopular policies." According to this theory, independent constitutional
courts are created when hegemonic elites realize that (1) even if they retain power,
democratic pressures will make it hard for them to impose cherished policies and (2)
they find economic and judicial elites who can be appointed to courts and can be trusted
to impose the blocked policies judicially." Ginsburg and Hirschl's arguments provide
an explanation for why elites in democracies will sometimes choose to vest judges with
the power of judicial review and will sometimes not. Studying the creation of the SCC
allows us to ask whether these theories can also help explain the rise of judicial review at
particular times in authoritarian countries. It seems that if we modify these arguments
slightly, they can indeed help.
As noted already, Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir died in 1970, only a year after the creation of the
toothless Supreme Court. When Anwar al-Sadat succeeded him as head of the ruling party
and President, he inherited an authoritarian state in crisis. Nasirist policies had left Egypt
in a ruinous economic condition. 6 Furthermore, a humiliating military defeat suffered
at the hands of Israel in 1967 had led many to question Arab socialism of the Nasirist

For a review and criticism of arguments that modem states are delegitimized if they do not permit judicial
enforcement of human rights, see Hirschl, Ran (2004) 'The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism'
(11) Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. at 71, 74-79. For a summary of arguments that modem regulatory states need
independent courts to effectively set policy or police the bureaucracy, see, e.g., Moustafa, The Struggle supra
note 9 at 198-201.
13 See generally Ginsburg, Tom (2003) JudicialReview in New Democracies:Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases.
14 See generally Hirschl, Ran Towards Juristocracy:The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalismor
the abbreviated form of the argument published as Hirschl, 'Political Origins' supra note 12. See particularly
90-105.
15 Hirschl, 'Political Origins' supra note 12 at 91.
16 On Egypt's economic policies and performance under Nasir and Sadat, see generally Wahba, Mourad (1994)
The Role of the State in the Egyptian Economy; Waterbury, John (1983) The Egypt of Nasir and Sadat.
12
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variety and the Egyptian government was facing ideological challenges from both secular
liberals and Islamists-each of whom demanded liberalization of the political and social
sphere. Sadat proposed to revitalize the authoritarian Egyptian state by embarking upon
an ambitious policy of economic liberalization and economic growth funded by foreign
investment.7 This was to be accompanied by a change in the ideological justification for
the regime from one of Arab socialism to a controlled liberalism and Islamism.8 The
government's decision to give the SCC an increased amount of independence must be seen
against this backdrop.
In an important monograph on the SCC, Tamir Moustafa has argued at length that at
the time the SCC was created, Sadat's inner circle assumed private investment would not
grow in the absence of judicial review.19 This was not idiosyncratic. Prevailing wisdom
held at that time that economic liberalization would fail to attract investment unless a
strong independent court was available to hear property rights disputes. Noting this,
Moustafa explains the creation of the SCC as a largely mechanical response to this perceived
need: investors wanted a court that would define property rights expansively and protect
them vigorously; therefore, the Egyptian government created a strong constitutional court
whose judges, coming from a historically liberal profession, could be expected to do this.
Moustafa's careful argument is important and, to an extent, convincing. Nevertheless,
it has not provided a complete explanation for Sadat's decision to create the type of
constitutional court that he did. The SCC was paradoxically stronger and weaker than one
would expect if the Court had been created simply to provide a forum for the vindication
of investor's property rights. The SCC's jurisdiction encompassed more than property
rights cases. Thus, the new Court was more powerful than it needed to be. Furthermore,
it was a creation of the executive and, as we shall see, could be reined in by the executive.
Thus it was too weak, by itself, to guarantee protection of property from an executive
bent on expropriation. One can combine Moustafa's insights about Egypt, however, with
Hirschl's insights about constitutional judicialization in other contexts. By doing so, one
can develop a more complete and persuasive explanation for the court's creation.
As Moustafa has amply demonstrated, an ascendant faction in Egypt felt that they
would lose power if controversial economic reforms were not undertaken. Such reforms
were, however, deeply unpopular. They were very hard to push through the legislature,
in which skeptics were powerful.20 The supporters of economic liberalism knew that any
attempt to take consistent steps towards radical economic and political liberalization (and
possibly Islamization) might lead to a revolt by important party factions and might cause
reformers to lose control over the whole party. In this environment, the creation of an

17 On the Islamist challenge and Sadat's response, see Beattie, Kirk (2000) Egypt during the Sadat Years at 200210.
18 The administration turned for assistance to Sufi Abu Talib, who published an ideological tract in 1978 in alIqtisadi,July 16, 1978 and then served as speaker of the captive legislature entrusted with the task of developing
legislation that would realize the new ideology. See Beattie, Egypt during the Sadat Years at 168-171 and Reinich,
Jacques (1977-78) 'The Arab Republic of Egypt' in (2) Middle East ContemporarySurvey at 391-92.
19 See generally Moustafa, The Struggle supra note 9.
20 Sadat's difficulties 'selling' his plan are evident in inconsistencies one finds in the 1971 Constitution enacted
by a legislature completely dominated by the ruling party. On the legislature's schizophrenic policies towards
private property, see Hill, Enid (1999) 'The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt on Property' in BernardMaugiron, Nathalie and Dupret, Baudouin (eds) (1999) Le Prince et son juge: droit et politique dans l'Egypte
contemporaine at 55-92.
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independent constitutional court had attractions beyond its role in comforting private
investors. By empowering the constitutional court to hear claims under provisions of the
constitution protecting civil rights and by guaranteeing Islamization, economic liberals
tried to attract to their cause a number of disparate factions, some of which inclined towards
political liberalism and some of which inclined to a moderate form of Islamism. In other
words, the economic liberals who controlled the Sadat regime believed they could transfer
responsibility for its unpopular economic liberalization plan to a court enjoying popular
legitimacy because it was a guarantor not just of economic rights but also of political rights
and of the right to live under a regime that respected Islamic norms. In short, the Court
would not only facilitate economic liberalization, but it would immunize the decision to
liberalize from reversal by anti-reform factions of the party.
Moustafa's explanation for the empowerment of the Egyptian constitutional court thus
seems to become stronger if we consider that it may also reflect what Hirschl has called the
'judicialization' of controversial policy decisions. Looking at non-autocratic case studies,
Hirschl predicts judicialization of the economic and political policies will occur when 'the
judiciary's public reputation for professionalism, political impartiality and rectitude is
relatively high'; judicial appointments are (or at least can be) controlled to a large extent by
hegemonic political elites; and, arguably, judges 'mirrored the cultural propensities and
policy preferences of these hegemonic elites'.21 In autocratic Egypt, these conditions were
generally met. In the face of intra-party debate about the wisdom of economic reforms,
an ascendant faction of economic liberals wanted to design popular judicial institutions
that would be inclined to carry out economic reforms in a way that the existing political
institutions resisted.
Having empowered a constitutional court for largely instrumental reasons, Sadat
and his allies tried to ensure that the Court did what it was supposed to-but no more.
Concerned, apparently, that judges who protected private property might acquire broader
liberal agendas, the SCC was eventually structured so that it could be reined in if it became
too aggressive in promoting a political liberalization that would threaten the elite's hold
on power. Sadat's successor eventually felt compelled to use these checks.
THE STRUCTURE, STAFFING AND PROCEDURES OF THE SCC
Law 48 of 1979 replaced the much derided Supreme Court with a new SCC which had
broad jurisdiction and whose justices were, in comparison to the judges on the Nasir's
original constitutional court, remarkably powerful and independent. 22 The executive,
however, retained nearly total control over appointments to the court.
Jurisdiction
Article 25 of Law 48 of 1979 entrusts the SCC with three main duties. First, it is to serve as
the final authority in case of a jurisdictional dispute between two Egyptian courts. Second,
it has the power to issue authoritative interpretations of legislative texts if different

See Hirschl, 'Political Origins' supra note 12 at 91. The ideological shift from socialism had the added
advantage of being attractive to both Western and Gulf Arab nations -each a source of foreign aid.
22
Law No. 48 (1979), supra note 11.
21
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judicial institutions (for example, the national courts and the administrative courts) have
disagreed about their proper interpretation and 'they have an importance that necessitates
their uniform interpretation'. Finally, Article 25 grants the SCC the right to perform
constitutional review in certain cases, including ones where lower courts determine that a
legitimate constitutional question needs to be resolved.
According to Article 29 of the Court's statute, if a court hearing a case has concerns
about the constitutionality of legislation that is at issue in the case, it may sua sponte refer
the case to the SCC. Alternatively, if a litigant in the course of litigation challenges the
constitutionality of legislation, pertinent to his or her case, the court hearing the case must
determine whether the claim is 'plausible' and, if so, must either refer the case to the SCC
on its own or, in the alternative, authorize the challenger to raise the constitutional issue
before the SCC. In managing constitutional cases, then, a symbiotic relationship exists
between the regular courts (or administrative courts) and the SCC. The SCC relies largely
on judges in these other courts to refer cases to it; and the judges in these other courts
themselves rely on the SCC to strike down legislation that they believe unconstitutional.?
Theoretically, through this system, the public might be prevented from raising legitimate
constitutional claims before the courts. With a few exceptions, however, the courts have
been quite willing to refer constitutional claims to the SCC. 24 The discussion of cases in
the next section will make clear that citizens have been able to bring an enormous number
of constitutional claims, both minor and momentous, to the attention of the SCC. As
a practical matter, then, courts have so far permitted citizens ample access to the SCC.
Furthermore, the co-operative mode arguably adds to the legitimacy of the SCC's decisions
and increases the odds of compliance.
Once a case has been properly referred, the SCC must hear it. That said, once a case is
on the SCC's docket, the Court has the power to hear and decide the case quickly or to delay
the process of hearing or deciding the case. Occasionally, the Court seems strategically to
have chosen how quickly to decide cases-withholding decisions on some important cases
in the hopes, thereby, of gaining leverage over the executive.
Procedures
Once a case has been referred to the SCC, it is examined by a special'Commissioners Body',
composed of highly respected jurists assigned to assist the Court.2 5 The commissioners
assist the justices in preparing for cases. After the case has been prepared, it will be
reviewed by some number of justices. Law 48 does not set the exact number of justices
sitting on the SCC, nor the exact number who must hear a case. Article 3 of Law 48 merely

I For an analysis of the process, see Sherif, Adel Omar (2002) 'Constitutional Adjudication, in Dupret and
Bernard- Maugiron, (eds) (2002) Egypt and its Laws, supra note 2 at 329-38.
24 Some examples include the national courts' refusal to refer to the SCC the constitutional issues arising in
the apostasy trial of Nasir Hamid Abu Zayd and the administrative court's (including the High Administrative
Court's) refusal to refer to the SCC the constitutional issues arising in the constitutional challenge to a Ministry
of Health order banning female genital mutilation. My thanks to Justice Adel Omar Sherif for drawing my
attention to these cases.
25 Articles 21-24 of Law 48 establish that these assistants must have the qualifications necessary to be justices
on the SCC, and they get life tenure and salary protection. The preparation of the case by such jurists adds to
court prestige and quality. Commissioners have often been appointed to be Justices, and some of the Court's
best known judges have been former commissioners.
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requires that a quorum of at least seven members must decide each case. The ambiguity
in the law regarding the number of justices seems to be deliberate, and its importance will
become apparent below.
Article 49 of Law 48 provides that, once a majority has reached a decision, the Court
must produce an opinion. If in the majority, the Chief Justice will write the opinion, and if
not in the majority, he or she will assign it to a judge of his or her choosing.26 Once seven
justices certify that an opinion represents the views of a majority on the Court, the opinion
becomes final. Pursuant to Article 49, it must then be published in Egypt's Official Gazette
and any decision to void a law automatically becomes effective the day after publication.
With respect to opinions, it is important to note that dissenting judges do not have a right
to have their dissents recorded.2 7 The power to write or assign opinions combined with
the absence of dissents gives the Chief Justice extraordinary power to shape the Court's
jurisprudence-particularly if the Chief Justice is in the majority.
Qualifications and protections for justices
Law 48 contains provisions designed to guarantee that the Court's justices are respected
both for their qualifications and independence. Article 4 provides that, to be eligible
for a position on the Supreme Constitutional Court, a justice must have extremely high
qualifications. This helps to guarantee the prestige of the Court, the Court's position
relative to other courts and, to a certain degree, its position relative to the executive.
Articles 5 and 11-20 also provide the justices of the Court with significant guarantees
of independence. Once appointed, justices cannot be removed prior to the mandatory
retirement age except by consent. Judges also have salary protections. All disciplinary
issues are to be handled by the SCC itself.
Appointment and Number of Justices
Given the wide jurisdiction of the Court, the considerable access that citizens have to date
had to the Court,28 and the prestige and independence of the SCC's justices, the executive
has a strong interest in selecting who can ascend to the bench. Not surprisingly, therefore,
Law 48 leaves the executive very tight control over appointments to the bench. Article
5 provides that the president appoints a Chief Justice by presidential decree. Outside
of the requirement that the Chief Justice have the qualifications necessary to serve as a
justice on the SCC, the President has absolute discretion in his choice. Article 5 provides
that associate justices are also appointed by presidential decree. In appointing associate
justices, however, the president must select from between two nominees: one nominated by
the Chief Justice and one nominated by the general assembly of the Court. The provision
apparently anticipates that the Chief Justice and the majority of his court may disagree

If the justices cannot agree on a rationale, the majority will settle on one opinion. No dissent will be
published. See Sherif, Adel Omar 'The Freedom of Judicial Expression: The Right to Concur and Dissent' in
Boyle and Sherif (eds) Human Rights and Democracy supra note 7 at 137-58.
27
On this practice, see Sherif 'The Freedom of Judicial Expression' supra note 26 at 144-45.
28 Given the ongoing willingness of lower courts to refer constitutional cases to the SCC.
26
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about who is appropriate to serve on the Court, and it allows the President to favor the
preferences of the Chief Justice.
As noted above, Law 48 of 1979 does not specify the number of justices on the Court.
Arguably, if the Chief Justice and Court choose to nominate candidates and the President
chooses to appoint them, there can be an infinite number of justices. The importance of this
fact has recently become clear. If a Chief Justice and President both dislike the decisions of
majority on the Court, they can collude to pack the court with justices sympathetic to their
views. This is not merely a hypothetical power. As we shall see, in the early 2000s, the
executive did seek to control the Court by packing it with friendly justices.
THE SCC AS A POLITICAL AND LEGAL ACTOR
Having seen the Court's independence, and its potential vulnerability to court-packing,
we can turn to a discussion of the Court's behavior and its jurisprudence to date. During
its first twenty years, the SCC evolved in significant ways. Beginning as a court with
limited ambitions and policy preferences very much in keeping with that of the Egyptian
president, the SCC developed into a court committed to reforming and liberalizing the
entire Egyptian legal and political system, a policy entirely at odds with the wishes of the
President.
1980 - 2000: From Economic Rights to Social and Political Rights
Sadat's willingness to create an independent constitutional court seems to have rested on
his belief that, if appointments were made carefully, the Court could be trusted to provide
credible guarantees of property rights-something that members of the legislature and
bureaucracy were unwilling and, arguably, unable to do. Similarly, he believed that
careful appointment of judges could ensure that the Court did not become a force for
aggressive political liberalization. Sadat's confidence seemed at first to be well placed. In
1981, shortly after the SCC started operations, Sadat was assassinated and a subordinate,
Husni Mubarak, took power in Egypt. As a policy matter, Mubarak was similar to Sadat in
his commitment to economic liberalization and aversion to political liberalization. Thanks
to Sadat's careful appointments, little in the Court's early jurisprudence gave Mubarak
much cause for worry.
When the SCC was first set up, the Egyptian President had, for the most part, allowed
judges who had already served on the Supreme Court to staff the SCC. These judges
were appointed to the SCC precisely because their jurisprudential proclivities were
known. Not surprisingly, the SCC began its life acting more or less as Sadat had expected.
When the SCC began to hear cases in 1980, its jurisprudence showed a commitment first
to establishing aggressively the Court's own broad powers and independence. 29 Having
done so, the Court focused considerable attention on challenges to economic legislation,

See, e.g., Case No. 28, Judicial Year 2 (May 4, 1985), 3 SCC 195-208. (The Court's official reporter is officially
named Al Mahkama al-Dusturiyya al-'Ulia, Abbreviated henceforth as "SCC.") On the SCC's increasingly
ambitious assertions of judicial independence and power, see Sherif 'Constitutional Adjudication' supra note
23 at 339-40.
29
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clarifying the meaning of the ambiguous constitutional guarantees of private property. 0
In a series of cases, the SCC identified in Articles 29-36 conflicting principles requiring the
protection for private property but also a duty on the part of the executive to guarantee
equitable distribution of wealth and government services. Asserting for itself the right to
strike the proper balance, the Court quickly established a consistent and credible policy of
protection for property rights. Thus, as Enid Hill and Tamir Moustafa have demonstrated,
the Court provided invaluable support to the ruling party, in its attempts to move the
nation away from a statist economy and towards economic liberalization.3 1
The Court did not remain content, however, to act as a champion of economic liberalism
alone. In the late 1980s, the Court's old guard began to retire, and a new generation
of judges came to be appointed. To the consternation of the President, these justices
embraced a more expansive vision of the liberal state, one in which people enjoyed not
only substantial economic rights but civil and political rights as well. Scholarship to date
has not focused on explaining how these justices were selected, and thus it is not clear how
the President ended up appointing justices (particularly Chief Justices) with views that
were so threatening to his authority. The fact remains that such appointments were made.
By the mid-1980's the SCC was demonstrating a willingness to check the executive
when it seemed unambiguously to violate explicit constitutional limitations on executive
power-even if their decision touched upon sensitive issues. The SCC confronted the
executive as early as 1985, when it issued a starting ruling setting limits on the executive's
emergency powers. 32
By 1985, Egypt had long been governed (and indeed is to this day is governed) by a
seemingly interminable state of emergency, pursuant to which the executive has claimed
extraordinary powers. Confident that his emergency powers could be invoked for
whatever purpose he, in his discretion, thought wise, President Sadat in 1979 decided
to enact controversial family law reforms by emergency decree. The reforms in question
granted women a number of important new rights. Initially these reforms were supposed
to be enacted through normal legislation. However, they were vigorously opposed by
the religious establishment and, ultimately, by many Egyptians. The proposed reforms
proved to be so controversial that Sadat's captive legislature was reluctant to enact them
through the regular legislative process. Reluctant to court revolt within the ranks of the
ruling party, Sadat enacted them as an Emergency Decree.
In 1985, the Supreme Constitutional Court stunned the new President, Husni Mubarak,
by holding that his predecessor's 1979 actions had been unconstitutional, and by voiding
the 1979 reforms.33 The Court held that when legislating pursuant to his emergency
powers, the President must demonstrate a reasonable nexus between the emergency
decree and the security of the state. As the President had not demonstrated this, the family

so See, e.g., the summary of cases by Chief Justice Awad El-Morr, published as 'The Status and Protection of
Property in the Constitution' in Human Rights and Democracy, supra note 7 at 115-27; see also, Hill'The Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt on Property' supra note 20.
1 See generally Hill 'The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt on Property' supra note 21 (see particularly
the comments at 88); see also Moustafa The Struggle supra note 9 at 119-136 (particularly the comments at 136).
32 Case No. 28 Judicial Year 2 (May 4, 1985), printed in SCC, Vol. 3, 195-208.
3
Case No.28 of Judicial Year 2 (May 4, 1985), 3 SCC, 195-208. For an analysis of the case, an analysis that was
co-authored by two justice of the SCC, see E1-Morr, Awad and Sherif, Adel Omar (1996) 'Separation of Powers
and Limits on Presidential Powers', in Human Rights and Democracy supra note 7 at 68-71. See also Lombardi
State Law supra note 2 at 169-171.
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law reforms were void and would have to be re-enacted by regular legislative process.
After this embarrassing rebuke, a reform bill was subsequently introduced and passed by
the legislature, but the reforms therein were less ambitious. The new executive had also
been warned that, at least in some cases, the SCC was willing to stand up to him.
In the late 1980s, the SCC made clear that its 1985 decision was not an aberration. It
engaged in a series of striking opinions that tried to limit the executive's control over
the political system. In a notable series of decisions (ones extremely embarrassing for
the executive) the Court repeatedly struck down the laws under which local and national
elections were held.3 4 The last of these led to the dissolution of Egypt's national legislature
and forced new elections.' In the 1990s, the SCC expanded its focus and began to protect an
ever expanding range of individual rights. To do this, it had to come up with constitutional
doctrines that would allow it to protect implied rights.
Incorporating International Human Rights Norms into Egyptian Constitutional Law
The Court's ability to uphold citizens' rights outside the area of property and political
participation seemed at first to be limited by the nature of the Egyptian Constitution, which
did not provide many unambiguous checks on government power. The extensive rights
provisions of the Constitution are phrased in vague or contradictory ways. The Court thus
found it difficult actively to restrain the President or his captive legislature without either
interpreting the existing rights provisions expansively or developing a doctrine of implied
rights.3 6 In the mid-1990s, the Court began to do both.
In the early 1990s, the SCC identified within the text of the 1971 Constitution two
overarching, somewhat ambiguous, constitutional principles that the majority argued
should inform all others. The first principle consisted of a guarantee of 'the rule of law'.
Article 64 of the Constitution makes the rule of law 'the basis of state rule'. Article 65
provides unequivocally that the state is 'subject to [the rule of] law', and declares that
judicial independence is a necessary safeguard of liberties. The Court argued that these
provisions permit and indeed require the Court to incorporate international human rights
principles into Egyptian constitutional law. The second overarching principle was that all
law should conform to Islamic legal principles. In the Court's opinion, the two principles
were mutually reinforcing because, in a series of much discussed opinions, the Court
interpreted Islamic legal principles in a creative manner to support its liberal rulings in the
area of economic rights, civil and political rights and equal protection.17
At the start of the 1990s in the preface to volume IV of the SCC's official reporter, the
sixth Chief Justice of the Court, Mamduh Mustafa Hasan, hinted that the Court intended
to adopt an expansive interpretation of citizens' civil and political rights-one that was
shaped by evolving international human rights law. Today, he said, individual rights 'take

Case No.131, Judicial Year 6 (May 16, 1987), Case No.23, Judicial Year 8 (April 15, 1989) printed in 4 SCC
205-217; Case No.14, Judicial Year 8 (April 15, 1989) printed in 4 SCC 191-204, Case No.37, Judicial Year 9
(May 19, 1990) printed in 4 SCC 256-293. The cases are discussed by a justice of the SCC in Sherif, Adel Omar
'Constitutional Adjudication' in Bernard-Maugiron and Dupret Egypt and its Laws supra note 2 at 342-43 and in
Moustafa supra note 9 at 98-100.
a Case No. 37 Judicial Year 9 (May 19, 1990), reprinted in 4 SCC 256-93.
* Nathan Brown has made this point perceptively in Brown The Rule of Law supra note 2 at 118-120.
* See discussion below.
3
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an international character which transcends the various regional limits. Their tendencies
find their clear expression in a number of international documents and in the institutions
of the international judiciary which is in charge of these rights'." Shortly thereafter, in a
seminal 1992 case, Hasan's Court interpreted the Constitution's 'rule of law' provisions to
establish the principle that the Egyptian government was constitutionally bound to obey
emerging international human rights standards-even when these were not specifically
referenced in the Egyptian Constitution.39
From this point on, the SCC's judges actively tried to bring Egyptian law into line
with emerging human rights norms. Justices and members of the Court's Commissioners
Body promoted scholarship in the areas of comparative constitutional law and human
rights law, and they sponsored conferences that promoted such scholarship by others.40
In public speeches and published writings they argued that constitutional judges were
required to draw upon this scholarship and incorporate into Egyptian constitutional
law human rights principles that are widely shared among constitutional democracies. 41
These writings were sometimes published in appendices to the Court's own Reporter,
giving them a peculiar status between academic commentary and an attempt at official
clarification of the Court's decisions.
A survey of Court opinions makes clear that the Court's discussions about the
incorporation by Egypt of international norms represented more than empty theorizing.
In the 1990s, the SCC regularly cited international human rights documents or the
opinions of other constitutional courts in order to shed light on the rights that the Egyptian
Constitution guarantees to Egyptians. 43 The SCC then applied their ever more expansive
list of rights to restrain the executive and to expand in unprecedented ways a wide range of
freedoms, including, inter alia,the freedom of the press, freedom of association, the sanctity
of the home, and the right to marry. In so doing, the SCC's justices directly confronted the
executive, which was not only opposed to expanding rights but was actually in the mid1990s trying to take away previously recognized rights."

4 SCC, 4-5. Translation follows Johansen, Baber 'Supra-legislative Norms and Constitutional Courts: The
Case of France and Egypt' in Cotran & Sherif (eds) The Role of the Judiciarysupra note 6 at 37-38 (1997) at 367.
3
Case No. 22, Judicial Year 8 (January 4, 1992), 5 SCC (Part I) 89. See also the analyses in Sherif, Adel Omar
'Unshakeable Tendency in the Protection of Human Rights: Adherence to International Instruments by the
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt' in Cotran and Sherif (eds) The Role of the Judiciarysupra note 6 at 37-38;
Boyle, Kevin 'Human Rights in Egypt: International Commitments' in Boyle and Sherif (eds) Human Rights and
Democracy supra note 7 at 89-90; Johansen 'Supra-legislative Norms' supra note 38 at 367-68.
40 The Court sponsored in the 1990s a series of important international conferences in Cairo on international
human rights and the judicial protection thereof. See Moustafa supra note 10 at 168-69. Papers were published
in: Boyle and Sherif (eds) Human Rights and Democracy supra note 8 and Cotran and Sherif (eds) The Role of the
Judiciarysupra note 7.
41 See, for example, the extraordinary discussion in El-Morr, Awad (1997) 'Judicial Sources for Supporting the
Protection of Human Rights' in Cotran and Sherif (eds) The Role of the Judiciarysupra note 6 at 5-10.
42 See, e.g., El-Morr, Awad 'Human Rights as Perceived by the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt' 7 SCC
at 2-121.
43 Anyone who reads the SCC Reporter in the 1990s will find numerous references to foreign and international
law. One scholar found "Through the mid-1990s between one-quarter and one-half of all SCC rulings
incorporated specific aspects of international legal or foreign rulings. Even more referred to 'accepted
international standards,' broadly stated, and to the comparable judicial principles of other 'civilized nations."'
Moustafa The Struggle supra note 9 at 168.
44 For an analysis of the Court's decisions in this area and the degree to which they interfered with newly
restrictive state policies, see Moustafa The Struggle supra note 9 at 140-164.
38
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The Justification of Liberal Jurisprudence in Islamic Terms
One intriguing development that occurred during the court's liberal heyday is that as the
Court began to move into confrontation with the executive, it began to use Islamic legal
arguments in support of its liberal vision.
Islamic law was very much part of Egyptian political legal and discourse in the 1980s
and 90s. Responding to pressure from Islamists, Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution
had been amended in 1980 to say that 'the principles of the Islamic Shari'a5 are the chief
source of Egyptian legislation'. Islamists and, indeed, most Egyptians believed that the
1980 amendments created a new constitutional requirement that all laws conform to 'the
principles of the Islamic Shari'a'. Although secular liberals contested this interpretation,
the SCC in 1985 agreed with the Islamists- at least in part. In Case 20, Judicial Year 1 (May
4, 1985), the Court held that Article 2 created a justiciable requirement that legislation
enacted after the amendment of Article 2 in 1980 conform to the principles of the Islamic
Shari'a.46 Thereafter, the Court began with growing regularity and confidence to measure
Egyptian laws not only for consistency with explicit constitutional rights guarantees
and unwritten human rights norms, but also with the principles of the Islamic Shari'a, as
interpreted by the SCC. The results were not, however, what secular liberals had feared.
After the Court's 1985 decision, some secularists fretted that the constitutionalization
of Shari'a principles represented a capitulation to conservative Islamic forces in Egypt
and suggested that it would prevent judges from endorsing a liberal interpretation of the
Egyptian constitution.4 7 These fears proved unfounded. Building creatively on classical
and modernist theories of Islamic law, the SCC argued that the 'principles of the Islamic
Shari'a' to which Article 2 refers are highly general principles that leave the political
branches considerable legislative latitude. These principles do not require the government
to enact into law many specific rules that classical Muslim jurists considered to be part
of the Shari'a. Rather, according to the Court, Article 2 required the government, in most
areas of legislation, to respect only a handful of specific Islamic rules. It would, however,
have to respect general moral principles that reflected the overarching 'goals' of Islamic

law.48
The Court's Article 2 jurisprudence realizes, in certain ways, the aspirations of a number
of modern liberal Islamic thinkers-not only in Egypt but in countries like Pakistan as

The term 'Shari'a' here means 'God's law' as revealed in the Qur'an, and reflected in the Prophet's behavior.
I Case 20, Judicial Year 1 (May 4, 1985), printed in 3 SCC 209-224. For an analysis, see Lombardi State Law
supra note 2 at 159-73.
47 See, e.g., comments in Mary Ann Weaver (informed by talks with Egyptian intellectuals) in (June 8, 1998)
'Letter from Cairo: Revolution by Stealth' The New Yorker at 38.
4 For a monograph on Article 2, see Lombardi State Law supra note 2. See also Lombardi, Clark and Brown,
Nathan'Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari'a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt's Constitutional
Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law' (21) Am. LI.Intl L. Rev. For other perspectives, see
Bernard-Maugiron, Nathalie 'La Haute Cour Constitutionelle Egyptienne et la Shari'a Islamique' (19) Awrdq
103; Bernard-Maugiron, Nathalie 'Les Principes de la sharia sont la source de la l6gislation' in Le Prince et son
Juge, supra note 21 at 107; Dupret, Baudoin (1995) "La Chari'a est la source de la 16gislation': interpretations
jurisprudentielles et theories juridiques' (34) Annuaire de l'Afrique Nord at 261; Johansen, Baber 'The Relationship
between the Constitution, the Shari'a and the Fiqh: The Jurisprudence of Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court'
in (64) Zeitschriftfirausldndisches Offentliches Recht und Vtlkerrecht at 881; Vogel, Frank (1999) 'Conformity with
Islamic Shari'a and Constitutionality under Article 2: Some Issues of Theory, Practice and Comparison' in
Cotran and Sherif (eds) Democracy, The Rule of Law and Islam at 525.
4
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well. To understand this, it helps to consider classical Islamic legal theory, the challenge
that modern Islamic legal thinkers levied at classical theory and the way in which the SCC
incorporates modern Islamic legal theory in the service of a liberal vision of law.
Classical Islamic legal theory assumed that a special class of trained Islamic scholars
was uniquely qualified to interpret God's law.49 When reasoning out law from the
scriptures, these scholars identified two types of rule. The first type was those rules
that were 'certain' to represent divine commands. These 'definitive' rules were found
explicitly stated in texts that the scholars had determined to be definitively authentic. The
second type was ones that a scholar had determined were probably (but not surely) divine
commands. These non-definitive rules were found in texts of uncertain authenticity or else
were presented in language that the scholars thought contained some subtle ambiguity.
While classical Muslim scholars expected by and large to agree on the definitive rules, they
understood that they would disagree on the probable rules of Shari'a.
In the modern era, several trends appeared that, together, led many Muslims to
question the assumptions of classical Islamic legal theory. 0 First, many Muslims came
to accept that Islamic legal interpretation could be carried out by people who had not
received classical Islamic legal training. Second, many Muslims came to believe that those
who interpreted Islamic law should use new methods of interpretation. Among the new
methods were utilitarian methods of reasoning. Among them too were methods that
saw traditional Islamic rules as merely the application in a particular time and place of
underlying divine principles-principles that represented the timeless aspect of the divine
command. These principles were the only norms that bound modern Muslims. One could
identify these underlying principles by induction-inducing them from a study of the
many different rules that had been laid down at different times and places. Working
from their new methods of interpretation, lay interpreters around the world, including
Egypt, came to question laws that had long been considered definitive and to develop
novel interpretations of Islamic law. Some of these new interpretations were reactionary
on some issues, being more restrictive than classical Islamic law, for example, on questions
of women's rights. Other untraditional modern interpretations of Islamic law were
extremely progressive.
Naturally, in twentieth century Egypt, 'Islamist' political groups were not monolithic.
Some Islamists urged the government to 'Islamize' the law in accordance with the largely
conservative views of the classically trained scholars; some urged the government to
'Islamize' the law according to liberal views espoused by liberal lay Islamic thinkers; and
others urged the government to hew to the reactionary views of fundamentalist thinkers."
By the time Egypt agreed to Islamize its laws, the Muslim community had become deeply
divided about what Islamization would entail.
Given the change in notions of religious authority in Egypt, the explosion of diverse
new interpretations, and the balkanized nature of the Islamist political movement, judges
on the SCC found themselves able in Article 2 cases to construct a theory of Islamic legal

49 See Lombardi State Law supra note 2 at 13-17. Monographs discussing this phenomenon, include Hallaq,
Wael (2005) The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Stewart, Devin (1998) Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Shi'ite
Responses to the Sunni Legal System.
50 See Lombardi State Law supra note 2 at 59-77; see also, Kurzman, Charles (ed) (2002) Modernist Islam: 18401940 at 3-30.
s1 See Lombardi State Law supra note 2 at 101-119.
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interpretation that was considered plausible by many Islamists and which permitted
(indeed, it arguably required), the government to respect the liberal rights that the Court
had committed itself to protecting.
The Court's theory evolved slowly. By the late 1980s, the Court had asserted without
much explanation that Islamic law supported its rulings protecting property rights.52
In the early 1990s, shortly after the SCC announced its ambitious effort to incorporate
international human rights norms into Egyptian constitutional law, the judges on the
Court elaborated upon their understanding of Islamic law. The method that the SCC
eventually developed was subtle. For the purpose of this article, the important points are
the following: First, according to the Court, it was constitutionally required only to ensure
that its rules did not violate (a) the definitive rules of Shari'aor (b) the 'goals' of the Shari'a.
Like classical jurists, the SCC distinguished between definitive and non-definitive rules of
Shari'a.However, using a modified form of modernist methodology, the Court concluded
that there were very few definitive rules of Shari'a. And what definitive rules they found
tended to be extremely general principles that could be interpreted and applied in a
manner that was consistent with the justices' liberal assumptions about individual human
rights. Similarly, when the Court identified a series of social 'goals' that the Shari'a tended
to promote, it found a series of goals that were quite general and were capable of being
understood to favor a liberal, rights-friendly society in which men and women enjoyed
largely equal rights.
As a result, the constitutional requirement that Egypt respect Islamic norms did not
preclude the government from enacting laws that were inconsistent with classical Islam,
but which improved the rights of women in questions of family law. For example, to the
distress of conservative Islamists, the Court permitted the government to depart from
traditional Islamic laws governing family relations. The Court held that an 'Islamic'
legal system could (a) require a man who divorced his wife without cause to support the
divorced wife, and (b) award the wife special custody of older children from the marriage.M
Such a government could also allow a woman to sue for dissolution of her marriage if her
husband took a second wife,5 and it could allow a court to issue retroactive orders of child
support.56 Most dramatic of all, the Court held that the Egyptian government does not
transgress the principles of the Islamic Shari'a when it adopts regulations banning school
girls from veiling themselves. In each of these cases, the government rule was inconsistent
with classical interpretations of Shari'a and was highly unpopular among conservative
Islamists in Egypt.57

52 See id. at 175-78.

a

See id. at 174-200. For other analyses, see generally Johansen 'The Relationship between the Constitution,
the Shari'a and the Fiqh' supra note 48; Vogel 'Conformity with Islamic Shari'a' supra note 48.
5
Case No. 7, Judicial Year 8 (May 15, 1993), printed in 5 SCC (part 2) 265-90; analysis in Lombardi State Law
supra note 2 at 202-18.
5
Case No. 35, Judicial Year 9 (August 14, 1994) printed in 6 SCC 351-8; analysis in Lombardi State Law supra
note 2 at 224-36.
5
Case No. 29, Judicial Year 11 (March 26, 1994), printed in 6 SCC 231-56. French translation by Baudouin
Dupret (4) Islamic Law and Society 91-113 (1997). Analysis in Lombardi State Law supra note 2 at 218-224.
5
Case No. 8, Judicial Year 17 (May 18, 1996), 8 SCC 344-367. For an English translation, see Brown, Nathan J.
and Lombardi, Clark 'The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and Human Rights:
An Annotated Translation of Supreme Constitutional Court Case No 8 of Judicial Year 17 (May 18, 1996)' (21)
Am. LI.Intl. L Rev. at 437.
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More intriguing still, the Court suggested, the constitutional command to respect
Islam reinforced the recently announced constitutional requirement that the Egyptian
Government must respect international legal norms-providing alternate grounds for
rulings that protected international human rights. Thus, laws were occasionally struck
down not only because they violated the property rights provisions of the constitution or
the international human rights that had been incorporated into the Egyptian Constitution,
but also because they violated, at the same time, the constitutional provisions requiring
the state to respect Islamic norms. Thus, for example, a number of restrictions on private
property were struck down on the grounds that they were inconsistent both with the
Constitution's specific private property rights provisions and with Article 2's general
requirement that the state respect Islamic norms." Similarly, a restriction on certain
government officials' right to marry foreign women was struck down on the grounds that
it violated both international human rights norms guaranteed under the Constitution's
general requirement that the government respect the rule of law and Article 2's command
to respect Islamic norms.5 9 Not only did Islamization fail to restrain the liberal Court, then,
but Islamic arguments were occasionally used to support some of the Court's controversial
human rights decisions.
1980-2000: The Court's Attempt to Insulate Itself from Executive Backlash
The justices on the SCC were not naive. It was clear that their active protection of civil and
political rights in the 1990s was as unwelcome to President Mubarak as their protection
of economic rights had been welcome. Mubarak had total control over the legislature
and bureaucracy and thus could revise laws or, if necessary, amend the Constitution, so
as to destroy the Court. As they began to set out upon an activist liberal trajectory in the
1990s, the justices used a number of tools to try and insulate themselves from anticipated
executive interference.
In his monograph on the Court, Tamir Moustafa has carefully explored the tools
that the Court employed to protect itself and has explained why they were inadequate.60
Among the tools was the tool of calculated self-restraint. As aggressive as the Court was
in striking down laws in sensitive areas, it was not as aggressive as it could have been.
For example, it conspicuously chose to uphold the regime's highly controversial use of
Emergency State Security Courts to try politically sensitive cases. 61 Similarly, it never ruled
on the constitutionality of President Mubarak's decision to declare and never renounce,

See, e.g., Case No. 68, Judicial Year 3 (March 4, 1989), 4 SCC 148-64 (striking down a government order
expropriating not only the real property of a wealthy landowner subject to the law, but also the real property
of all his adult children); Case No. 65, Judicial Year 4 (May 16, 1992) (striking down a law governing the desequestration of land); Case No. 25 of Judicial Year 11 (May 27, 1992), 5 SCC 408-428 (striking down laws
regulating seizure of property); Case No. 6 of Judicial Year 9 (March 18, 1995), 6 SCC 542-566 (striking down
restrictions on a landlord's right to choose his tenants). For an analysis, see Lombardi State Law supra note 2 at
175-178, 236-240 (2006).
9 See. e.g., Case No. 23, Judicial Year 16 (Decided March 18, 1995) 6 SCC 567-96; Case No. 31, Judicial Year 16
(may 20, 1995) printed in 6 SCC 716-39 and Case No. 25, Judicial year 16, July 3, 1995, printed in 7 SCC 45-94.
For analyses of all these cases, see Lombardi State Law supra note 2 at 255; Bernard Maugiron 'La Haute Cour'
supra note 48 at 127-28.
60 Moustafa The Struggle supra note 9.
61 Case 55, Judicial Year 5 (June 16, 1984) printed in 3 SCC, 80-89.
58
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for almost thirty years, a 'State of Emergency' that left him with extraordinary powers.62
Some evidence suggests that the Court deliberately delayed issuing opinions on some
cases that were potentially damaging to the executive -sometimes for up to ten yearswith the implicit threat that, if the executive ignored SCC rulings or interfered with the
Court's liberal majority, a damaging opinion would be issued.
The justices also sought to empower and build alliances with a number of institutions
in civil society-both in Egypt and abroad.64 They did this in part by the mechanism
of judicial review itself-striking down laws restricting speech and assembly and thus
allowing civil society groups to operate. When not on the bench, liberal justices also wrote
and spoke regularly on the importance both of civil society and of judicial independence.
As Moustafa has described, the alliance with NGOs and other civil society institutions
served a number of important functions. For one, NGOs generated, funded and prosecuted
the cases challenging state authority that were, at the end of the day, the SCC's reason for
existence and the source of its power. The alliance also helped to increase the visibility
and popularity of the SCC, both domestically and abroad -something that might raise the
costs for Mubarak if he ignored the Court's rulings or used the power of appointment to
break their majority.
Finally, as we have described already, the SCC came increasingly in the 1990's to rely
on Islamic arguments. In numerous cases where a law was struck down on the basis of
enumerated or un-enumerated constitutional rights, the SCC would explain why, based
on its liberal interpretation of Islamic law, this law also violated Article 2's requirement that
all law be consistent with the Islamic Shari'a. While the judges seem to have believed in
good faith that they were interpreting the Shari'a properly, the willingness to hear Islamic
cases and to attempt regularly to articulate an alternate 'Islamic' ground for aggressive
liberal rulings can be seen as an effort to build support among the powerful Islamic
opposition. The goal was, in part, to create broader support for its liberal understanding
of the Constitution's individual rights provisions and to create a diverse constituency that
would resist any attempt by the executive to interfere aggressively with the increasingly
pesky liberal majority on the Court. The Court's aggressive moves to preserve its liberal
majority and liberal outlook were not, ultimately, as successful as they had hoped.
2000-Present: The Taming of the SCC
In the late 1990's President Mubarak and his inner circle prepared an attack on the Court.
They began by suppressing the institutions in civil society that were supportive of the Court.
When the Court's Chief Justice died in 2001, the regime was confident it had neutralized the
institutions that could mobilize effective domestic and international support for the Court.
Using his carefully reserved powers of appointment, 6 the President appointed as Chief
Justice an unapologetic political ally of the executive and an outspoken critic of the Court's
earlier attempts to interfere with repressive executive action. This Chief Justice proceeded

62 In interviews with several justices in 2001, this was described to me as one of the Court's greatest pieces of

unfinished business.
" See Moustafa The Struggle supra note 9 at 181-82.
6
See generally Moustafa The Struggle supra note 9 at 136-54, 169-72, 178-92. The discussion below draws on
his analysis.
I On this event including telling interviews, see Moustafa The Struggle supra note 9 at 198-201.
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immediately to nominate (and the President proceeded to appoint) five new justices to the
court. In a stroke, he eliminated the liberal majority. Not surprisingly, thereafter, the SCC
revealed little of its previous appetite for confrontation with the executive. More troubling
to some observers, in several cases the SCC invoked its rarely-used power to interpret
statutes that had received inconsistent interpretations in the lower courts and overturned
rights-protective opinions in the regular court system. 66
To outsiders, at least, the Court had come full circle. Writing in the 1990s, Nathan
Brown was struck by the ways in which the SCC had departed from its roots in Nasir's
anti-liberal Supreme Court. He echoed the views of many when he said that the SCC
had transformed itself 'from a check on the judiciary into the boldest judicial actor in the
country'.67 Brown, however, sounded a note of caution, wondering if it could continue to
act so boldly.68 This caution proved wise. Writing in 2007, Moustafa described in detail
how the SCC had become once again, a tool to suppress activist liberal jurisprudence in
the Egyptian courts.
With President Mubarak in his 80s, Egypt will soon change its head of state and
potentially will undergo some deeper political reform. The memory of the SCC's liberalism
has not disappeared. Some distinguished liberal constitutionalists remain on the court and
others could theoretically be appointed. It remains to be seen what new shapes and roles,
if any, the Court will take on in the future.
LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SCC
Studying the SCC is interesting for a number of reasons. For students of comparative
constitutional law, the history of the SCC provides a provocative example of judicial
review being established in an authoritarian regime. One question is whether it occurs
for the same reasons that it occurs in democratizing or established democratic countries.
Moustafa has argued that in developing countries like Egypt, the explanation for the
creation of the SCC is largely to be found in the executive's belief that independent courts
will help the nation attract capital. Supplementing this, I have argued above that we should
recalibrate theories of hegemonic preservation to account for intra-elite fighting in a oneparty state. If we do, theories of hegemonic preservation may help to further explain why
the Sadat regime created the SCC at the time that it did and with the structure that it did.
Studying the SCC also reminds us that autocrats are wise to fear constitutional courts
and to retain emergency brakes over the process of judicialization. Courts are selected
because their judges are likely to support the executive's most important policy objectives
and probably will share them for a time. Yet, as the SCC demonstrated, independent
judges, though they can help an autocratic executive in some ways, also tend over time to
start acting in ways that are distressing to the executive. Such behavior is not unforeseeable.
This brings us to another point. Given the oedipal tendency of courts to rebel against
the expectations of their founders, autocratic executives try to give judges enough
independence to carry out the objectives for which they were created. But the executives
also try to retain some ability to take control of the court if the court's behavior becomes

66
67
68

See generally, Moustafa The Struggle supra note 9 at 136-54, 169-72, 178-92.
See Brown The Rule of Law supra note 2 at 104.
Id. at 126-128.
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too threatening to the executive. The history of the SCC is revealing on this point, showing
the fragility of any judicial rebellion in an autocratic system. Although judicial review
does at times arise in an authoritarian context, the power of independent judicial review
in authoritarian countries often remains extremely weak and cannot be exercised in a
robust manner without support from informal networks in politics and civil society that
are themselves vulnerable.
Ultimately, the SCC, which had transformed itself from an illiberal institution to an
active liberal one, was transformed by the executive back into a less active, and apparently
less liberal, one. This suggests that the most significant challenge to evolutionary theories
about the inevitable spread of judicial review may not lie in the stories of countries that
have chosen to withhold independent judicial review. It may instead lie in the stories of
authoritarian countries like Egypt that have been able indirectly to control how it is used
and what its effect will be. There are still more chapters to be written in the history of the
SCC. Nevertheless, the history of this institution to date leaves open the possibility that
the SCC's tale will prove to be a cautionary one. If judicial review can be turned on or off
when convenient, judicial review is liable to spread, but it is also liable to have few of the
salutary effects that its champions suggest. What signs of hope are there? One ambiguous
sign appears in an unlikely place.
One possible lesson from the history of the SCC involves the role of Islam in the
constitutional jurisprudence of Muslim states. The experience of the SCC suggests that
Muslim views about Islamic legal interpretation are far less rigid than people may realize.
In nations that constitutionalize Islamic law, courts can assert the power to interpret Islamic
law and, indeed, to interpret it creatively and liberally. In some cases, the Court chose to
cite Islamization provisions as a justification for liberal decisions in the area of property
rights and even human rights. We have mentioned above that liberal constitutional
courts in authoritarian countries can gain power and freedom if they can build support
networks in civil society. In light of this, the SCC's use of Islamic law for liberal purposes
is provocative, and its ability to do so with minimal protest from the Muslim opposition
(and indeed with some support) is intriguing.69
Muslim autocrats have long been successful at playing their Islamic opposition
off against their secular liberal opposition, arguing that their respective interests are
fundamentally misaligned. The SCC's Article 2 jurisprudence argues implicitly that the
perceived misalignment is a chimera. The SCC was never able to forge a really effective
secular/Islamist support network-or at least one that was effective enough to prevent the
executive from destroying the SCC's liberal majority through its power over court staffing.
Nevertheless, the SCC's overtures to Islamists were not entirely rebuffed. One wonders
whether, in another country, a more effective alliance could be built. And indeed, one
wonders whether in Egypt, a new alliance might arise that unites moderate Islamists and

69 For the lack of criticism, see the discussion in Lombardi State Law supra note 2 at 259-264. Nathan Brown

and Amr Hamzawy report that when a handful of younger members of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt championed stripping the SCC's jurisdiction over Article 2 cases (and instead giving them to a new
institution), they were harshly criticized by leading Brothers-with the explicit comment that the SCC was
the appropriate body to continue interpreting Article 2. See Brown and Hamzawy (2008) 'The Draft Party
Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Foray Into Political Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions?'
(89) Carnegie Papers,Middle East Series at 7-8.
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liberal judges -an alliance that might provide judges with popular support and enable a
re-emergence of liberal judicial power and liberal constitutionalism in Egypt.
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